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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAVID LEE HEWITT,
Petitioner and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 930035-CA
Priority No. 3

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent and Appellee.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to both
Utah Code Ann. section 77-18a-1(b) and section 78-2a-3(g)(1953
as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Was the Appellant's writ justly dismissed under the demise
of a waiver and being time-barred.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court should apply the "Substantial Fairness" standard
of review and/or in the alternative apply the "Abuse of
Discretion" standard in consideration of the issues in this case,

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appendix I of the breif contains the full text of the
following controlling constitutional and statutory provisions:
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Constitution of Utah, Article I section 5
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 11
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 26
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 27
U.S. Constitution Amendment V
U.S. Constitution Amendment VI
U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV Section I
U.S. Constitution Article I section I (9)
Utah Code Ann. section 77-18a-1(b)
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(g)
Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-31.1
Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-42
Utah Code Ann. section 78-12-43
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 65B(b)(10)
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, rule 4-203
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, rule 4-604

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal sought by the Appellant from a decision
rendered by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge, Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on a Writ for
Extraordinary Relief filed with said court.

The Appellant was

sentenced to a term of 1 to 15 years at the Utah State Prison
for Retail Theft on February 4, 1991 by the Honorable Judge
Michael R. Murphy.

On February 11, 1992, the Appellant did file

a Writ for Extraordinary Relief with the Third District Court.
On December 16, 1992,

Judge Michael R. Murphy did dismissed the

Writ on grounds that it was (1) Not addressed on a direct appeal,
(2) That it was time-barred.

Appellant filed Notice of Appeal

with the Third District Court on January 12th, 1993.
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importantly the knowledge of legal process in which to present
the issues to the courts, and whether the petitioner is physically
or mentally able to present the issues. Except for the provisions
of section 78-12-31.1, appellants would have a right, which is
mandated by both Constitutions, to enforce their remedy under
known and accepted concepts of law.
Article I section 11 of the Utah Constitution (Hereafter
as section 11) is part of the Declaration of Rights.

It declares

that an individual shall have a right to a "remedy by due course
of law" for injury to one's "person, property, or reputation."
Specifically, that section states:
All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this state,
by himself or counsel any civil cause to which
is a party.
Thirty-seven states

have constitutional provisions that

are essentially similar to the Utah provision.

These provisions,

which have no analogue in the federal Constitution, and the
better-known due process clauses found in both state and federal
constitutions appear to have originated with the Magna Carta
and "Sir Edwards Coke's Gloss on Chapter 29 of the 1297 Magna
Carta [which] is remarkably similar to these remedy provisions."
Provision such as section 11 have been referred to as "open
courts" clauses and remedy clauses.
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In fact, section 11 was

designed to accomplish several purposes.

The clear language

of the section guarantees access to the courts and a judicial
procedure that is based on fairness and equality.

See Generally

Celebrity Clubf Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d
1293f 1296 (1982); Industrial Commission v. Evans, 52 Utah 394,
409, 174 P. 825, 829 (1918).

A plain reading of section 11 also

established that the framers of the Constitution intended that
an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of effective
remedies designed to protect basic individual rights.

A

constitutional guarantee of access to the courthouse was not
intended by the founders to be an empty gesture; individual are
also entitled to "due course of law " for injuries to "person,
property, or reputation."
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in referring to the history
of that's state's similarly worded open court provision stated
that it was intended to secure adequate remedies for violated
rights.

The court stated:

The concept of allowing a reasonable period
of time for suit to be brought after the cause
of action arises is not new in our law, for
along with "substantive rights, the first
settlers brought over the individual, rights
of adequate remedy and convenient procedure";
State v. Saunders, 66 N.H. 39, 74, 25A. 588,
589 (1889). Thus, the "right to an adequate
remedy [exists] for the infringement of a right
derived from the unwritten law." Id, 25A. at
589. When it came time to establish a postrevolution form of government, the first part
of our Constitution [which included an open
courts provision] was devoted to chronicling
our inherent rights.
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Defining the scope of the constitutional protection that
section 11 affords individual substantive rights is a task of
the utmost delicacy and requires a careful consideration of others
important, and sometimes competing, constitutional interest.
The meaning of section 11 must be taken not only from its history
and plain language, but also from its functional relationship
to other constitutional provisions.

Section 11 and Due Process

clause of article I, section 7, of the Utah Constitution, are
related both in their historical origins and to some extent in
their constitutional functions. To a degree, the two provisions
are not wholly duplicative.

Both act to restrict the powers

of both the courts and the legislature.

See generally Masich

v. United States Smelting, Refining and Mining Co., 113 Utah
101, 191 P.2d 612, 623-24, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866 (1948).
The law in this state, as it is elsewhere, is that "no one
has a vested right in any rule of law" under either the open
courts or the due process provisions of the Utah Constitution.
Specifically, neither the due process nor the open court
provision constitutionalizes the common law or otherwise freezes
the law governing private
of statehood.

rights and remedies as of the time

Nevertheless, the Legislature does not have the

power to abolish all the rights of action for injuries to one's
person.

In Masich, supra,113 Utah at 124, 191 P.2d at 624, the

court stated "that if the Legislature were to abolish all
negligence actions against employers and provide no substitute
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remedy, the act would be unconstitutional.11

To some extent,

therefore, the common law at the time of statehood provides at
least a measure of the kinds of legal rights that the framers
must have had in mind for the protection of life, property, and
reputation.

One of the important functions of the legislature

to change and modify the law that governs relations between
individuals as society evolves and conditions require.

However,

once a cause of action under a particular rule of law accrues
to a person by virtue of an injury to his rights, that person's
interest in the cause of action and the law which is basis for
a legal action becomes vested, and a legislative repel of the
law cannot constitutionally divest the injured person of the
right to litigate the cause of action to a judgment.
Necessarily

the legislature has great latitude in defining,

changing, and modernizing the law, and in doing so may create
new rules of law and abrogate old ones.

Nevertheless, the basic

purpose of Article I, section 11 is to impose some limitation
on that power for the benefit of those persons who are injured
in their persons, property, or reputations are generally isolated
in society, belong to no identifiable group, and rarely are able
to rally the political process to their aid.
The Appellant's contention that section 11 is only a
"philosophical statement" that imposes no limitations on
legislative power is unacceptable.

If the legislative prerogative

were always paramount, and the legislature could abolish any
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or all remedies for injuries done to a patron, his property,
or reputation, section 11 would be a useless appendage to the
Constitution.

The very assertion that section 11 is only a

"philosophical statement" is necessarily inconsistent with the
premise of a written constitution which was intended to be, and
is, a statement of positive law that limits the powers of
government.

Article I, section 26 rivets section 11, and all

other rights in the Declaration of Rights, (Utah) into the
fundamental law of the State, and makes them enforceable in a
court of law.

Article I, section 26 declares that "the provisions

of this constitution are mandatory and prohibitory unless by
express word they are declared to be otherwise".

The rights

protected by section 11 are not declared to be other than
"mandatory and prohibitory".

Additionally, in further

examination, Article I, section 27 states that "frequent
recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security
of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government".
The South Dakota Supreme Court stated to this view in Daugaard
v. Baltic Cooperative Building Supply Ass'n, S.D., 349 N.W. 2d
419, 425 (1984):
Our constitution... is solid core upon which
all our state laws must be premised. Clearly
and unequivocably, our constitution directs
that the courts of this state shall be open
to the injured and oppressed. We are unable
to view this constitutional mandate as a faint
echo to be skirted or ignored. Our constitution
is free to provide greater protections for our
citizens than are required under the federal
constitution... Our constitution has spoken,
and it is our duty to listen.
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If the court relied on the general principle that one of
the functions of the legislative power is to remedy defects in
the common law as they develop, and to adapt to the change of
time and circumstance, and the court also relied heavily on the
usual deference that courts accord legislative enactments by
a way of presumption of constitutionality, they might be able
to agree with and affirm those principles as general propositions
but should not agree that a proper constitutional analysis of
section 11 can be made on those principles alone.

The courts

are simply not at liberty to eviscerate a mandatory provision
of our Declaration of Rights by limiting their analysis to those
principles alone.

That kind of analysis would result in the

legislative powers prevailing in every case, and would deprive
the constitutional rights embraced in section 11 of any meaningful
content or force.

If the courts are free to refuse to give

substance and meaning to section 11 because in stands in tension
with the power of the legislature to adjust conflicting interests
and values in society, we could as well emasculate every provision
in the Declaration of Rights by the same method of analysis.
The courts should decline to do this.
The statute, section 78-12-31.1 according to the Appellee,
merely defines the time during which a cause of action exists.
By definition, then, when that time expires, no cause of action
exists, and none is therefore abrogated.

The injured party simply

has no cause of action, and the injury done him is damnum absque
injuria.
- 10 -

The courts should reject this view because it begs the
question.

The question, in view, is whether there is a remedy

by due course of law, and that question is not answered by arguing
that a cause of action is not abrogated but is only defined to
be temporally limited.

In short, the constitutional, protection

cannot be evaded by the semantic argument that a cause of action
is not cut off but only defined to exist for a specified period
of time.
To a degree, the open court provision is an extension of
the due process clause.

Indeed the open courts provision and

the due process clause also have an overlapping function, to
some extent, with respect to the abrogation of cause of action.
If the Legislature were to abolish all causes of action for
injuries to one's person or property, and provide no substitute
equivalent remedy, there would be little doubt that that would
violate section 11, and perhaps even the due process clause of
Article I, section 7.

In Masich v. United States Smelting and

Refining Co., 113 Utah 101, 125, 191 P.2d 612, 624 (1948), The
Court stated:
Assuming the legislature can abolish the common
law rights of action for negligence, must it
return a substitute right to each and every
employee in some way affected by the abrogation
to meet the test of constitutionality? If the
legislature were to abolish all compensation
and all common law rights for negligence of
an employer, no contention could reasonably
be made that it was a proper exercise of the
police power. The reverse would be true and
pauperism with is concomitants of vice and crime
would flourish.
- 11 -

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Wilson v.
Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902), noted the fundamental obligation
of government to provide reasonable remedies for wrongs done
persons.
Every government is under obligation to its
citizens to afford them all needful legal
remedies... A statute could not bar the existing
rights of claimants without affording this
opportunity [to try rights in the court]; if
it should attempt to do so, it would not be
a statute of limitation, but an unlawful attempt
to extinguish rights arbitrily, whatever might
be the purport of its provision."
Id. at 62.
The basic rule has been summarized in a leading treatise,
51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitations of Action, section 28:
It is not within the power of the legislature,
under the guise of a limitation provision, to
cut off an existing remedy entirely, since this
would amount to a denial of justice...
In sum, section 11 does not recede before every legislative
enactment, but neither may it be applied in a mechanical fashion
to strike every statute with which there may be conflict.

To

hold every statute of limitation unconstitutional without regard
to the legislative purpose could result in a legislative inability
to cope with widespread social or economic evils.

In the instant

case, the Legislature has imposed less than a total abrogation
of all remedies, since actions are barred only after a specified
period of time has elapsed.
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that section 11 of the
Declaration of Rights and the prerogative of the legislature
are properly accommodated by applying a two-part analysis.

First

section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured person
an effective and reasonable alternative remedy "by due course
of law11 for vindication of his constitutional interest.

The

benefit provided by the substitute must be substantially equal
in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in providing
essentially comparable substantive protection to one's person,
property, or reputation, although the form of the substitute
remedy may be different.

See generally Masich v. United States

Smelting, Refining, and Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612,
624 (1948); See also New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S.
188, 201 (1917), where the United States Supreme Court in dictum
stated, "Among the historic liberties so protected was a right
to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified
intrusions on personal security." (Footnote omitted).

In

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 94 (1980),
Justice Marshall, in a

concurring opinion, suggested that a

reasonable alternative remedy must be provided that when "core"
common-law rights are abolished.
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be
justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to
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be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy
is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the
objective.
For the reasons stated above, the court should hold that
elimination of all causes of after the period specified in section
78-12-31.1 of Utah Code Ann. is arbitraryf unreasonable, and
will not achieve the statutory objective.

POINT II
SECTION 78-12-31.1 VIOLATES APPELLANT'S
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Appellant is entitled to the due process guarantees of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States and Section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitution
of Utah.

The due process aspects of statutes of limitations

was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in Wilson v.
Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55; 22 S. Ct. 573 (1902).

The court at page

575 stated:
...it may be properly conceded that all statutes
of limitations must proceed on the idea that
the party has full opportunity afforded him
to try his right in the courts. A statute could
not bar the existing rights of claimants without
affording this opportunity; if it should attempt
to do so, it would not be a statute of
limitations, but an unlawful attempt to
extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might
be the purport of its provisions. It is
essential that such statutes allow a reasonable
time after they take effect for the commencement
of suits upon existing causes of action...
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Section 78-12-31,1 does not provide a "reasonable time"
for the commencement of an action by a person who discovers the
rights violations one day before the period ends f nor does it
provide a reasonable time for the Appellants who may of had the
cause of action conceal and discovers after the period has run.
In fact the statute not only limits the time to bring an action,
but also removes the remedy of parties such as your Appellant,
Furthermore the statute in not a "limitations" statute, but is,
in fact, a transparent grant of immunity intended to benefit
one party of the cause of action, while excluding the other
logical member of the same cause of action*

The result is an

unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, thereby
violating the constitutional mandated protection of due process
of law.

POINT III
THE EXISTING DISABILITIES MUST TOLL
THE LIMITATIONS
The main thrust of the Appellant's claims is that he was
sentenced on unconstitutionally obtain and erroneous information.
See U.S. v. Strayer, 846 F.2d 1262 (10th Cir. 1988); U.S. v.
Mueller,, 902 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1990).

The causes are multiple,

and include, but are not limited to the ones addressed to the
courts.

These causes have severely and quite effectively disabled

the Appellant form obtaining equal protection and due process
that is guaranteed to everyone under the law.

- 15 -

(citing Article

I section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and the fifth and fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution).

These disabilities

were created and existed at the time of sentencing, and still
exist to this day*

See Utah Code Ann. 78-12-42.

The concealment, which was perpetuated by the Trial Court
was quite effective and would have remained so had not the
Appellant been further prejudiced and penalized by the same
inaccurate information at his Board of Pardons hearing, some
II months after receiving his sentence from the Trial Court.
See Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-203.
The lack of effective assistance of counsel that accumulated
at the time of sentencing and that is still persisting to this
day, has effectively disabled the Appellant from properly and
timely addressing the courts.

See Article I section 12 of the

Utah Constitution and Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
These are but two disabilities that the Trial Court both
knew about, or participated in, and which could have, and should
have, been eliminated by the Trial Court with proper intervention.
Nonetheless, because these disabilities were allowed to continue
the limitation must be toll in this cause of action.

In examining

Utah Code Ann. 78-12-43 which states:
When two or more disabilities coexist at
the time the right .of action accrues, the
limitation does not attach until all are removed.
Therefore pursuant to said statute, and because the Appellant
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has been caused and made to suffer from not only the disabilities
addressed above but multiple disabilities, the limitation must
be tolled in this case at bar.
A. THE TRIAL COURT MUST FOLLOW PROCEDURES.
1• The court can not avail itself the statute of limitations.
When the Trial Court ordered and did received a presentencing
report to be utilized in determining the applied sentence, should
not have there been disclosure to all parties involved.

See

U.S. v. Miller, 849,F.2d 896, 898 (4th Cir. 1988); also see Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-203 which states in
part:
... full disclosure of the presentence
investigation report shall be made to defense
counsel, the defendant and to the prosecutor...
The presentencing report shall also be made
available to prosecutors, defense counsel and
the defendant at the court on the date of
sentencing...
This was not done in the Appellant's case, and in fact the
Appellant did not receive constructive notice that a report did
indeed exist until November of 1991.

The Utah Supreme Court

has long held that there must be disclosure of the report.

See

State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (1980); State v. Casarez,
656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115,118
(Utah 1985); all which state in part:
Fundamental fairness requires that the
Trial Court disclose to a criminal defendant
his presentence report prior to sentencing in
order to better insure that the Trial Court's
sentencing discretion is based on accurate
information.
- 17 -

Fraudulent concealment is defined as "the hiding or
suppression of material fact or circumstance which the party
is legally of morally bound to disclose..."
Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).

See Black's Law

Based upon this definition then,

the court did perpetrate an act of fraudulent concealment.

Also

because of this prejudicial error by the court, this Court, should
bar the Trial Court from urging a statute of limitations judgment.
This basic principle announced in Rucker v. Ward, 131 Neb. 25,
267 N.W. 191 (1936) which states:
One who wrongfully conceals a material
fact necessary to the accrual of a cause of
action against him, and such concealment causes
the opposite party to delay the filing of the
suit cannot avail himself of the statute of
limitation as a defense.
The doctrine of contra non valentem is, in part, but an
application of the long-established principle of law that one
should not be able to take advantage of his own wrongful act.
2. The court incorrectly dismissed the writ.
In and after examination of the Appellant's fourth claim
stated in his original petition, the Trial Court dismissed the
claim, not on procedural grounds, but on review of the issue
and evidence gathered to determine the factual verity, did dismiss
the claim on grounds of being incorrect.

Because the claim was

dismissed on its merit, the Appellant who was not present, should
have been according to procedures outlined in the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
434 P.2d 753 (1967).

See Stinnett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 148,
Also see Utah Rules of Civil
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Procedure, 65B (b)(10), which states in part:
The petitioner shall be present before
the court at hearings on dispositive issues...
On examination of the definition of the word "shall"
contained in Black's Law Dictionary, (6th ed. 1990).

We find

th&t it's defined as meaning "must" and is inconsistent with
a concept of discretion.

Therefore the presents of the Appellant

before the Trial Court was mandatory.
Of the remaining three claims contained in the Appellant's
original petition, these were incorrectly dismissed.

The Utah

Supreme Court has held that, "a conviction or sentence that has
not yet been fully and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior
Habeas Corpus proceeding should not be denied re-examination
because of a procedural defualt."

See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d

1029, 1036 (Utah 1989); Id. at 1036.

Because the petition was

dismissed solely on procedural grounds, and the Trial Court did
not consider the substantive merit of the Appellant's allegations,
the dismissal was incorrect.

The Appellant should have the right

to litigate the cause of action to a judgment.
B. MUST BE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Defense counsel's conduct fell below reasonable standards
of performance.

Defense attorneys have the obligation to protect

the rights to proper sentencing hearing.
962 F.2d 996 (11th Cir. 1992).

See Wilson v. U.S.,

The Trial Court was aware of

a conflict of interest that existed between counsel and Appellant.
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This was made apparent by verbal reports given by both parties
to the court.

The court abused its discretion in letting this

appointment stand after these facts came to light during court
proceedings and the Appellant was prejudice by this lack of
effective representation.

See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,

"The Defense Function11 Standard 4-3 (Defense attorneys are
obligated to follow proper procedures, and present appropriate
motions and objections to protect the rights of their clients).
Trial counsel should have challenged the non-disclosure of the
presentencing report, and informed the court that the Appellant
had not had the opportunity to review the report prior to
sentencing being imposed.
Because of the Appellant's lack of understanding legal
procedures at the time, he relied totally in good faith in the
court appointed attorney.

Counsel never met with the Appellant

at any time other than for the short time that he was standing
in front of the court for proceedings.

Counsel did not talk

with him prior to sentence being imposed or inform Appellant
that a presentencing report had been submitted to the court.
After the sentence was imposed, counsel did not meet or talk
with the Appellant to discuss the consequences of the judgment
against him, or inform him of any meritorious grounds for an
appeal or the right to an appeal.

See Utah Rules of Judicial

Administration, Rule 4-604.
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The Appellant did not knowingly or voluntarily waive the
right to appeal. To fairly and properly waive a right to a
particular matter, should not the person know (1) that the right
exist, (2) the full and total consequences of such a waiver.
The Appellant did not know that there was either, the right of
appeal, or that an appealable issue existed.

Because counsel

did not explain the proceeding to the Appellant at the time,
when there was mention of an appeal by the Trial Court during
the sentencing hearing, the Appellant thought that the Trial
Court had forgotten that some months earlier when the plea was
entered, the court informed the Appellant that he was giving
up the right to an appeal by changing his plea.

The Appellant

presumed this to be any and all appeals and was part of the
conditions of the plea-bargain.
This goes to the very heart of the contention that the
Appellant was made to and prejudice from the disability of not
having effective assistance of counsel.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

See Strickland v.

Also see Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution.
Furthermore, because of the acts perpetuated by the Trial
counsel of not returning or convening with the Appellant before
of after sentencing, also after numerous requests were made,
both by himself, and his spouse, that were totally ignored by
counsel, the Appellant did not have 30 seconds, let alone 30
days to request his counsel to pursue an appeal.
State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981).
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See generally

Additionally, the Appellant should not be punished for his
attorney's failure in her performance which fell below objective
standards of reasonable performance, and this Court may reach
the merits of this issue and correct the error under the auspices
of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine.

See

Strickland, ABA Standards, supra.
Alternatively, this Court should affirm and utilize the
standard of "unusual circumstance" contemplated by the Utah
Supreme Court in both Brown v. Tunner, 440 P.2d 968 (Utah 1968);
and Rammel v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1979).

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing this Court should reverse the lower
court's order and remand the petition back for further and proper
proceedings consistent with its ruling.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ H

day of March, 1993.

DAVID LEE HEWITT
Appearing Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, David Lee Hewitt, hereby certifies that
he mailed eight copies of the forgoing to the Utah Court of
Appeals and two copies of the forgoing to the Attorney General's
Office, 330 South 300 East, 2nd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
this %\**> day of March, 1993.

David Lee Hewitt

APPENDIX 1
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

CONSTITUTION OP UTAH
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHT
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
requires it.
Sec. 7. [Due process of law]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Sec. 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting, or defending before any tribunal in this State,
by himself or counsel,any civil cause to which he is a party.
Sec. 12. Rights of accused persons]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial
by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal
in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
The provision of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
otherwise.

Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.]
Frequent recurence to fundamental principles is essential to
the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free
government.
AMENDMENTS AND ARTICLE OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning Due process of law and just compensation clauses ]
No preson shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United

States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the law.

ARTICLE I.
Sec. 9. [Powers denied Congress.]
[2.] The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

77-18a-1(b). Appeals - When proper.
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from:
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial
rights of the defendant;
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs
sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other
criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge
to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital
felony;

78-12-31.1.

Habeas corpus - Three months.

Within three months;
For relief pursant to a writ of habeas corpus. This
limitation shall apply not only as to grounds known to petitioner
but also to grounds which in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have been known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner

78-12-42. Disability must exist when right of action accrues.
No person can avail himself of a disability, unless it existed
when his right of action accrued.

78-12-43. All disabilities must be removed.
When two or more disabilities coexist at the time the right
of action accores, the limitation does not attach until all are
removed.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 65B (b) (10)
RULE 65B Extraordinary relief.
(b) Wrongful imprisonment.
(10) Hearings: After pleadings are closed, the court shall
promptly set the proceedings for a hearing or otherwise dispose
of the case. Upon motion for good cause, the court may grant
leave to either party to take discovery or to extend the date
for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, thn court may order either
the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing
conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. The
petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in the court
during the proceeding.

UTAH RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.
Rule 4-203. Presentence investigation reports.
Intent:
To provide uniformity in the distribution of presentence
investigation reports.

Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all appellate, district, juvenile,
circuit and justice courts, the Department of Corrrections, state
prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Presentence investigation reports shall be completed by
order of the court as provided in Utah Code Ann. Section 77-181 and 64-13-20* Presentence reports are classified as confidential
and shall not be available to the public. The documents shall
either be physically removed from the case file and kept in a
separate storage area, retained in the case file in a sealed
envelope marked "Confidential," or destoryed after sentencing.
(2) Full disclosure of the presentence investigation report
shall be made to defense counsel, the defendent and to the
prosecutor unless disclosure of the presentence report would
jeopardize the life or safety of third parties. The presentence
investigation report shall be made available to prosecutors,
defense counsel and the defendent two days in advance of
sentencing at the local office of the Department of Corrections
or such other location as ordered by the court. The presentence
report shall also be made available to prosecutors, defense
counsel and the defendant at the court on the date of sentencing.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)

Rule 4-604. Withdrawal of counsel in criminal cases.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for withdrawal of counsel
in criminal cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record and not
of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Withdrawal of counsel prior to entry of judgment.
(A) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an
attorney may withdrawal as counsel of record in criminal cases
except where withdrawal may result in a delay of the trial or
prejudice to the client. In those cases, an attorney may not
withdrawal without the approval of the court.
(B) A motion to withdrawal as an attorney in a criminal
case shall be made in open court with the defendant present unless
otherwise ordered by the court.

(2) Withdrawal of counsel after entry of judgment.
Prior to permitting withdrawal of trial counsel, the trial court
shall require counsel to file a written statement certifying:
(A) That the defendant has been advised of his right to
file a motion for a new trial or to seek a certificate of probable
cause, and if in counsel's opinion such action is appropriate
that the same has been filed,
(B) That the defendant has been advised of his right to
appeal and if in counsel's opinion such action is appropriate,
that a Notice of Appeal, a Request for Transcript, and in
appropriate cases, an Affidavit of Impecuniosity and an Order
requiring the appropriate county to bear the cost of preparing
the transcript have been filed.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)

